2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
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/* PASST - Plug A Simple Socket Transport
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* for qemu/UNIX domain socket mode
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*
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* PASTA - Pack A Subtle Tap Abstraction
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* for network namespace/tap device mode
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*
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* pasta.c - pasta (namespace) specific implementations
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2020-2021 Red Hat GmbH
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* Author: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
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*
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passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
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* #syscalls:pasta clone waitid exit exit_group rt_sigprocmask
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2022-02-26 23:39:19 +01:00
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* #syscalls:pasta rt_sigreturn|sigreturn armv6l:sigreturn armv7l:sigreturn
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* #syscalls:pasta ppc64:sigreturn s390x:sigreturn
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2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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*/
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#include <sched.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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2022-09-12 14:24:05 +02:00
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#include <libgen.h>
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2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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2022-09-12 14:24:07 +02:00
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#include <stdbool.h>
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2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <syslog.h>
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2022-02-18 16:12:11 +01:00
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#include <sys/epoll.h>
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#include <sys/inotify.h>
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2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <dirent.h>
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#include <arpa/inet.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <net/ethernet.h>
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#include <sys/syscall.h>
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#include "util.h"
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#include "passt.h"
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2022-09-12 14:24:03 +02:00
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#include "isolation.h"
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2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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#include "netlink.h"
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2022-09-24 09:53:15 +02:00
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#include "log.h"
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2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
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/* PID of child, in case we created a namespace */
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2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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static int pasta_child_pid;
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/**
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* pasta_child_handler() - Exit once shell exits (if we started it), reap clones
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* @signal: Unused, handler deals with SIGCHLD only
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*/
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void pasta_child_handler(int signal)
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{
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siginfo_t infop;
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(void)signal;
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passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
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if (signal != SIGCHLD)
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return;
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2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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if (pasta_child_pid &&
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!waitid(P_PID, pasta_child_pid, &infop, WEXITED | WNOHANG)) {
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passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
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if (infop.si_pid == pasta_child_pid)
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2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
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passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
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/* Nothing to do, detached PID namespace going away */
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2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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}
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waitid(P_ALL, 0, NULL, WEXITED | WNOHANG);
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waitid(P_ALL, 0, NULL, WEXITED | WNOHANG);
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}
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/**
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* pasta_wait_for_ns() - Busy loop until we can enter the target namespace
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* @arg: Execution context
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*
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* Return: 0
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*/
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static int pasta_wait_for_ns(void *arg)
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{
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struct ctx *c = (struct ctx *)arg;
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2022-03-27 13:10:26 +02:00
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int flags = O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC;
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2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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char ns[PATH_MAX];
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snprintf(ns, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%i/ns/net", pasta_child_pid);
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do
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2022-03-27 13:10:26 +02:00
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while ((c->pasta_netns_fd = open(ns, flags)) < 0);
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2022-01-25 20:08:00 +01:00
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while (setns(c->pasta_netns_fd, CLONE_NEWNET) &&
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!close(c->pasta_netns_fd));
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2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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return 0;
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}
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2022-09-12 14:24:05 +02:00
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/**
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* ns_check() - Check if we can enter configured namespaces
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* @arg: Execution context
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*
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* Return: 0
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*/
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static int ns_check(void *arg)
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{
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struct ctx *c = (struct ctx *)arg;
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2022-09-12 14:24:07 +02:00
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if (setns(c->pasta_netns_fd, CLONE_NEWNET))
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c->pasta_netns_fd = -1;
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2022-09-12 14:24:05 +02:00
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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2022-09-12 14:24:07 +02:00
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* pasta_open_ns() - Open network namespace descriptors
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2022-09-12 14:24:05 +02:00
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* @c: Execution context
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* @netns: network namespace path
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*
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* Return: 0 on success, negative error code otherwise
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*/
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2022-09-12 14:24:07 +02:00
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void pasta_open_ns(struct ctx *c, const char *netns)
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2022-09-12 14:24:05 +02:00
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{
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2022-09-12 14:24:07 +02:00
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int nfd = -1;
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2022-09-12 14:24:05 +02:00
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nfd = open(netns, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
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if (nfd < 0) {
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err("Couldn't open network namespace %s", netns);
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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c->pasta_netns_fd = nfd;
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NS_CALL(ns_check, c);
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if (c->pasta_netns_fd < 0) {
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err("Couldn't switch to pasta namespaces");
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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if (!c->no_netns_quit) {
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char buf[PATH_MAX] = { 0 };
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strncpy(buf, netns, PATH_MAX - 1);
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strncpy(c->netns_base, basename(buf), PATH_MAX - 1);
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strncpy(buf, netns, PATH_MAX - 1);
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strncpy(c->netns_dir, dirname(buf), PATH_MAX - 1);
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}
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}
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2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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/**
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2022-10-14 06:25:37 +02:00
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* struct pasta_spawn_cmd_arg - Argument for pasta_spawn_cmd()
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2022-10-14 06:25:28 +02:00
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* @exe: Executable to run
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2022-09-12 14:24:07 +02:00
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* @argv: Command and arguments to run
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2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
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*/
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2022-10-14 06:25:37 +02:00
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struct pasta_spawn_cmd_arg {
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2022-10-14 06:25:28 +02:00
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const char *exe;
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char *const *argv;
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passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
2022-10-14 06:25:37 +02:00
|
|
|
* pasta_spawn_cmd() - Prepare new netns, start command or shell
|
|
|
|
* @arg: See @pasta_spawn_cmd_arg
|
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: this function never returns
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-10-14 06:25:37 +02:00
|
|
|
static int pasta_spawn_cmd(void *arg)
|
2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-10-14 06:25:37 +02:00
|
|
|
const struct pasta_spawn_cmd_arg *a;
|
2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-10-14 06:25:32 +02:00
|
|
|
if (write_file("/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range", "0 0"))
|
|
|
|
warn("Cannot set ping_group_range, ICMP requests might fail");
|
2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-10-14 06:25:37 +02:00
|
|
|
a = (const struct pasta_spawn_cmd_arg *)arg;
|
2022-10-14 06:25:28 +02:00
|
|
|
execvp(a->exe, a->argv);
|
2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-26 06:58:39 +02:00
|
|
|
perror("execvp");
|
2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
/**
|
2022-08-26 06:58:39 +02:00
|
|
|
* pasta_start_ns() - Fork command in new namespace if target ns is not given
|
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
* @c: Execution context
|
2022-10-14 06:25:36 +02:00
|
|
|
* @uid: UID we're running as in the init namespace
|
|
|
|
* @gid: GID we're running as in the init namespace
|
2022-08-26 06:58:39 +02:00
|
|
|
* @argc: Number of arguments for spawned command
|
|
|
|
* @argv: Command to spawn and arguments
|
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-10-14 06:25:36 +02:00
|
|
|
void pasta_start_ns(struct ctx *c, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
|
|
|
|
int argc, char *argv[])
|
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2022-10-14 06:25:37 +02:00
|
|
|
struct pasta_spawn_cmd_arg arg = {
|
2022-10-14 06:25:28 +02:00
|
|
|
.exe = argv[0],
|
2022-08-26 06:58:39 +02:00
|
|
|
.argv = argv,
|
|
|
|
};
|
2022-10-14 06:25:36 +02:00
|
|
|
char uidmap[BUFSIZ], gidmap[BUFSIZ];
|
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
char ns_fn_stack[NS_FN_STACK_SIZE];
|
2022-10-14 06:25:28 +02:00
|
|
|
char *sh_argv[] = { NULL, NULL };
|
|
|
|
char sh_arg0[PATH_MAX + 1];
|
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
c->foreground = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (!c->debug)
|
|
|
|
c->quiet = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-14 06:25:36 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Configure user and group mappings */
|
|
|
|
snprintf(uidmap, BUFSIZ, "0 %u 1", uid);
|
|
|
|
snprintf(gidmap, BUFSIZ, "0 %u 1", gid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (write_file("/proc/self/uid_map", uidmap) ||
|
|
|
|
write_file("/proc/self/setgroups", "deny") ||
|
|
|
|
write_file("/proc/self/gid_map", gidmap)) {
|
|
|
|
warn("Couldn't configure user mappings");
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-09-28 06:33:14 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-08-26 06:58:39 +02:00
|
|
|
if (argc == 0) {
|
2022-10-14 06:25:28 +02:00
|
|
|
arg.exe = getenv("SHELL");
|
|
|
|
if (!arg.exe)
|
|
|
|
arg.exe = "/bin/sh";
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((size_t)snprintf(sh_arg0, sizeof(sh_arg0),
|
|
|
|
"-%s", arg.exe) >= sizeof(sh_arg0)) {
|
|
|
|
err("$SHELL is too long (%u bytes)",
|
|
|
|
strlen(arg.exe));
|
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
2022-08-26 06:58:39 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2022-10-14 06:25:28 +02:00
|
|
|
sh_argv[0] = sh_arg0;
|
|
|
|
arg.argv = sh_argv;
|
2022-08-26 06:58:39 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-11-13 02:21:47 +01:00
|
|
|
pasta_child_pid = do_clone(pasta_spawn_cmd, ns_fn_stack,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(ns_fn_stack),
|
|
|
|
CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET |
|
|
|
|
CLONE_NEWUTS,
|
|
|
|
(void *)&arg);
|
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (pasta_child_pid == -1) {
|
|
|
|
perror("clone");
|
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-10-14 06:25:29 +02:00
|
|
|
NS_CALL(pasta_wait_for_ns, c);
|
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* pasta_ns_conf() - Set up loopback and tap interfaces in namespace as needed
|
|
|
|
* @c: Execution context
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void pasta_ns_conf(struct ctx *c)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2021-10-14 13:05:56 +02:00
|
|
|
nl_link(1, 1 /* lo */, MAC_ZERO, 1, 0);
|
2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (c->pasta_conf_ns) {
|
2021-10-14 13:05:56 +02:00
|
|
|
nl_link(1, c->pasta_ifi, c->mac_guest, 1, c->mtu);
|
2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-07-22 07:31:17 +02:00
|
|
|
if (c->ifi4) {
|
2022-07-22 07:31:18 +02:00
|
|
|
nl_addr(1, c->pasta_ifi, AF_INET, &c->ip4.addr,
|
2022-11-04 04:10:33 +01:00
|
|
|
&c->ip4.prefix_len, NULL);
|
2022-07-22 07:31:18 +02:00
|
|
|
nl_route(1, c->pasta_ifi, AF_INET, &c->ip4.gw);
|
2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2022-07-22 07:31:17 +02:00
|
|
|
if (c->ifi6) {
|
2022-11-04 04:10:33 +01:00
|
|
|
int prefix_len = 64;
|
2022-07-22 07:31:18 +02:00
|
|
|
nl_addr(1, c->pasta_ifi, AF_INET6, &c->ip6.addr,
|
2021-10-19 09:01:27 +02:00
|
|
|
&prefix_len, NULL);
|
2022-07-22 07:31:18 +02:00
|
|
|
nl_route(1, c->pasta_ifi, AF_INET6, &c->ip6.gw);
|
2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2021-10-14 13:05:56 +02:00
|
|
|
nl_link(1, c->pasta_ifi, c->mac_guest, 0, 0);
|
2021-10-14 01:21:29 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
proto_update_l2_buf(c->mac_guest, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2022-02-18 16:12:11 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* pasta_netns_quit_init() - Watch network namespace to quit once it's gone
|
|
|
|
* @c: Execution context
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return: inotify file descriptor, -1 on failure or if not needed/applicable
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int pasta_netns_quit_init(struct ctx *c)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2022-08-23 08:31:51 +02:00
|
|
|
int flags = O_NONBLOCK | O_CLOEXEC;
|
2022-02-18 16:12:11 +01:00
|
|
|
struct epoll_event ev = { .events = EPOLLIN };
|
|
|
|
int inotify_fd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (c->mode != MODE_PASTA || c->no_netns_quit || !*c->netns_base)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-27 13:10:26 +02:00
|
|
|
if ((inotify_fd = inotify_init1(flags)) < 0) {
|
2022-02-18 16:12:11 +01:00
|
|
|
perror("inotify_init(): won't quit once netns is gone");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (inotify_add_watch(inotify_fd, c->netns_dir, IN_DELETE) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
perror("inotify_add_watch(): won't quit once netns is gone");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ev.data.fd = inotify_fd;
|
|
|
|
epoll_ctl(c->epollfd, EPOLL_CTL_ADD, inotify_fd, &ev);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return inotify_fd;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
|
* pasta_netns_quit_handler() - Handle ns directory events, exit if ns is gone
|
|
|
|
* @c: Execution context
|
|
|
|
* @inotify_fd: inotify file descriptor with watch on namespace directory
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void pasta_netns_quit_handler(struct ctx *c, int inotify_fd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char buf[sizeof(struct inotify_event) + NAME_MAX + 1];
|
|
|
|
struct inotify_event *in_ev = (struct inotify_event *)buf;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (read(inotify_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(*in_ev))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp(in_ev->name, c->netns_base, sizeof(c->netns_base)))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
info("Namespace %s is gone, exiting", c->netns_base);
|
|
|
|
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
|
|
|
|
}
|