2021-10-19 12:43:28 +02:00
|
|
|
.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
|
2022-02-19 04:39:47 +01:00
|
|
|
.\" Copyright (c) 2020-2022 Red Hat GmbH
|
2021-10-19 12:43:28 +02:00
|
|
|
.\" Author: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
.TH passt 1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SH NAME
|
|
|
|
.B passt
|
|
|
|
\- Unprivileged user-mode network connectivity for virtual machines
|
|
|
|
.br
|
|
|
|
.B pasta
|
|
|
|
\- Unprivileged user-mode network connectivity for network namespaces
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SH SYNOPSIS
|
|
|
|
.B passt
|
|
|
|
[\fIOPTION\fR]...
|
|
|
|
.br
|
|
|
|
.B pasta
|
2021-09-29 16:11:06 +02:00
|
|
|
[\fIOPTION\fR]... [\fIPID\fR|\fIPATH\fR|\fINAME\fR]
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SH DESCRIPTION
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SS passt
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.B passt
|
|
|
|
(\fIP\fRlug \fIA\fR \fIS\fRimple \fIS\fRocket \fIT\fRransport) provides full,
|
|
|
|
quasi-native network connectivity to virtual machines in user-mode without
|
|
|
|
requiring any capabilities or privileges.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The data plane implements a translation layer between a Layer-2 virtual network
|
|
|
|
interface and native Layer-4 (TCP, UDP, ping) sockets on the host, giving the
|
|
|
|
illusion that application processes residing on the guest are running on the
|
|
|
|
local host, from a networking perspective.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Built-in ARP, DHCP, NDP, and DHCPv6 implementations are designed to provide the
|
|
|
|
guest with a network configuration that tightly resembles the host native
|
|
|
|
configuration. With the default options, guest and host share IP addresses,
|
|
|
|
routes, and port bindings.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Port forwarding and translation allow networking services running in the guest
|
|
|
|
to be reachable from both local and remote hosts.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Unlike \fBslirp4netns\fR(1), \fBpasst\fR doesn't implement a full TCP stack: the
|
|
|
|
TCP translation layer has no stateful data buffering and operates by reflecting
|
|
|
|
one peer's observed parameters (congestion window size, acknowledged data, etc.)
|
|
|
|
to the corresponding peer.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Currently, the only supported hypervisor is \fBqemu\fR(1), connecting to
|
|
|
|
\fBpasst\fR by means of a UNIX domain socket. This configuration can be obtained
|
|
|
|
via out-of-tree qemu patches, available at:
|
|
|
|
|
2022-04-01 10:10:46 +02:00
|
|
|
\fIhttps://passt.top/passt/tree/contrib/qemu\fR
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
or with the \fBqrap\fR(1) wrapper.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SS pasta
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.B pasta
|
|
|
|
(\fIP\fRack \fIA\fR \fIS\fRubtle \fIT\fRap \fIA\fRbstraction) provides
|
|
|
|
equivalent functionality to network namespaces, as the one offered by
|
|
|
|
\fBpasst\fR for virtual machines.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-09-29 16:11:06 +02:00
|
|
|
If PID, PATH or NAME are given, \fBpasta\fR associates to an existing user and
|
|
|
|
network namespace. Otherwise, \fBpasta\fR creates a new user and network
|
|
|
|
namespace, and spawns an interactive shell within this context. A \fItap\fR
|
|
|
|
device within the network namespace is created to provide network connectivity.
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For local TCP and UDP traffic only, \fBpasta\fR also implements a bypass path
|
|
|
|
directly mapping Layer-4 sockets between \fIinit\fR and target namespaces,
|
|
|
|
for performance reasons.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SH OPTIONS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-d ", " \-\-debug
|
|
|
|
Be verbose, don't run in background.
|
|
|
|
|
2022-03-15 00:59:09 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-trace
|
|
|
|
Be extra verbose, show single packets, don't run in background. Implies
|
|
|
|
\fB--debug\fR.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-q ", " \-\-quiet
|
|
|
|
Don't print informational messages.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-f ", " \-\-foreground
|
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
Don't run in background. This implies that the process is not moved to a
|
|
|
|
detached PID namespace after starting, because the PID itself cannot change.
|
2021-10-21 20:13:18 +02:00
|
|
|
Default is to fork into background.
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-e ", " \-\-stderr
|
|
|
|
Log to standard error too.
|
|
|
|
Default is to log to system logger only, if started from an interactive
|
|
|
|
terminal, and to both system logger and standard error otherwise.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-h ", " \-\-help
|
|
|
|
Display a help message and exit.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-p ", " \-\-pcap " " \fIfile
|
|
|
|
Capture tap-facing (that is, guest-side or namespace-side) network packets to
|
|
|
|
\fIfile\fR in \fBpcap\fR format.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If \fIfile\fR is not given, capture packets to
|
|
|
|
|
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
\fB/tmp/passt_\fIISO8601-timestamp\fR_\fIPID\fB.pcap\fR
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
in \fBpasst\fR mode and to
|
|
|
|
|
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
\fB/tmp/pasta_\fIISO8601-timestamp\fR_\fIPID\fB.pcap\fR
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
in \fBpasta\fR mode, where \fIPID\fR is the ID of the running process.
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2021-10-14 12:17:47 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-P ", " \-\-pid " " \fIfile
|
|
|
|
Write own PID to \fIfile\fR once initialisation is done, before forking to
|
|
|
|
background (if configured to do so).
|
|
|
|
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-m ", " \-\-mtu " " \fImtu
|
|
|
|
Assign \fImtu\fR via DHCP (option 26) and NDP (option type 5).
|
|
|
|
By default, no MTU options will be sent.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-a ", " \-\-address " " \fIaddr
|
|
|
|
Assign IPv4 \fIaddr\fR via DHCP (\fByiaddr\fR), or \fIaddr\fR via DHCPv6 (option
|
|
|
|
5) and an \fIaddr\fR-based prefix via NDP Router Advertisement (option type 3)
|
|
|
|
for an IPv6 \fIaddr\fR.
|
|
|
|
This option can be specified zero (for defaults) to two times (once for IPv4,
|
|
|
|
once for IPv6).
|
|
|
|
By default, assigned IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are taken from the host interface
|
|
|
|
with the first default route.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-n ", " \-\-netmask " " \fImask
|
|
|
|
Assign IPv4 netmask \fImask\fR, expressed as dot-decimal or number of bits, via
|
|
|
|
DHCP (option 1).
|
|
|
|
By default, the netmask associated to the host address matching the assigned one
|
|
|
|
is used. If there's no matching address on the host, the netmask is determined
|
|
|
|
according to the CIDR block of the assigned address (RFC 4632).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-M ", " \-\-mac-addr " " \fIaddr
|
|
|
|
Use source MAC address \fIaddr\fR when communicating to the guest or to the
|
|
|
|
target namespace.
|
|
|
|
Default is to use the MAC address of the interface with the first default route
|
|
|
|
on the host.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-g ", " \-\-gateway " " \fIaddr
|
|
|
|
Assign IPv4 \fIaddr\fR as default gateway via DHCP (option 3), or IPv6
|
|
|
|
\fIaddr\fR as source for NDP Router Advertisement and DHCPv6 messages.
|
|
|
|
This option can be specified zero (for defaults) to two times (once for IPv4,
|
|
|
|
once for IPv6).
|
|
|
|
By default, IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are taken from the host interface with the
|
|
|
|
first default route.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note: these addresses are also used as source address for packets directed to
|
|
|
|
the guest or to the target namespace having a loopback or local source address,
|
|
|
|
to allow mapping of local traffic to guest and target namespace. See the
|
|
|
|
\fBNOTES\fR below for more details about this mechanism.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-i ", " \-\-interface " " \fIname
|
|
|
|
Use host interface \fIname\fR to derive addresses and routes.
|
|
|
|
Default is to use the interface with the first default route.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-D ", " \-\-dns " " \fIaddr
|
conf, udp: Introduce basic DNS forwarding
For compatibility with libslirp/slirp4netns users: introduce a
mechanism to map, in the UDP routines, an address facing guest or
namespace to the first IPv4 or IPv6 address resulting from
configuration as resolver. This can be enabled with the new
--dns-forward option.
This implies that sourcing and using DNS addresses and search lists,
passed via command line or read from /etc/resolv.conf, is not bound
anymore to DHCP/DHCPv6/NDP usage: for example, pasta users might just
want to use addresses from /etc/resolv.conf as mapping target, while
not passing DNS options via DHCP.
Reflect this in all the involved code paths by differentiating
DHCP/DHCPv6/NDP usage from DNS configuration per se, and in the new
options --dhcp-dns, --dhcp-search for pasta, and --no-dhcp-dns,
--no-dhcp-search for passt.
This should be the last bit to enable substantial compatibility
between slirp4netns.sh and slirp4netns(1): pass the --dns-forward
option from the script too.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-18 04:03:53 +01:00
|
|
|
Use \fIaddr\fR (IPv4 or IPv6) for DHCP, DHCPv6, NDP or DNS forwarding, as
|
|
|
|
configured (see options \fB--no-dhcp-dns\fR, \fB--dhcp-dns\fR,
|
|
|
|
\fB--dns-forward\fR) instead of reading addresses from \fI/etc/resolv.conf\fR.
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
This option can be specified multiple times, and a single, empty option disables
|
conf, udp: Introduce basic DNS forwarding
For compatibility with libslirp/slirp4netns users: introduce a
mechanism to map, in the UDP routines, an address facing guest or
namespace to the first IPv4 or IPv6 address resulting from
configuration as resolver. This can be enabled with the new
--dns-forward option.
This implies that sourcing and using DNS addresses and search lists,
passed via command line or read from /etc/resolv.conf, is not bound
anymore to DHCP/DHCPv6/NDP usage: for example, pasta users might just
want to use addresses from /etc/resolv.conf as mapping target, while
not passing DNS options via DHCP.
Reflect this in all the involved code paths by differentiating
DHCP/DHCPv6/NDP usage from DNS configuration per se, and in the new
options --dhcp-dns, --dhcp-search for pasta, and --no-dhcp-dns,
--no-dhcp-search for passt.
This should be the last bit to enable substantial compatibility
between slirp4netns.sh and slirp4netns(1): pass the --dns-forward
option from the script too.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-18 04:03:53 +01:00
|
|
|
usage of DNS addresses altogether.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-dns-forward " " \fIaddr
|
|
|
|
Map \fIaddr\fR (IPv4 or IPv6) as seen from guest or namespace to the first
|
|
|
|
configured DNS resolver (with corresponding IP version). Mapping is limited to
|
|
|
|
UDP traffic directed to port 53, and DNS answers are translated back with a
|
|
|
|
reverse mapping.
|
|
|
|
This option can be specified zero to two times (once for IPv4, once for IPv6).
|
|
|
|
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-S ", " \-\-search " " \fIlist
|
conf, udp: Introduce basic DNS forwarding
For compatibility with libslirp/slirp4netns users: introduce a
mechanism to map, in the UDP routines, an address facing guest or
namespace to the first IPv4 or IPv6 address resulting from
configuration as resolver. This can be enabled with the new
--dns-forward option.
This implies that sourcing and using DNS addresses and search lists,
passed via command line or read from /etc/resolv.conf, is not bound
anymore to DHCP/DHCPv6/NDP usage: for example, pasta users might just
want to use addresses from /etc/resolv.conf as mapping target, while
not passing DNS options via DHCP.
Reflect this in all the involved code paths by differentiating
DHCP/DHCPv6/NDP usage from DNS configuration per se, and in the new
options --dhcp-dns, --dhcp-search for pasta, and --no-dhcp-dns,
--no-dhcp-search for passt.
This should be the last bit to enable substantial compatibility
between slirp4netns.sh and slirp4netns(1): pass the --dns-forward
option from the script too.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-18 04:03:53 +01:00
|
|
|
Use space-separated \fIlist\fR for DHCP, DHCPv6, and NDP purposes, instead of
|
|
|
|
reading entries from \fI/etc/resolv.conf\fR. See options \fB--no-dhcp-search\fR
|
|
|
|
and \fB--dhcp-search\fR. A single, empty option disables the DNS domain search
|
|
|
|
list altogether.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-no-dhcp-dns " " \fIaddr
|
|
|
|
In \fIpasst\fR mode, do not assign IPv4 addresses via DHCP (option 23) or IPv6
|
|
|
|
addresses via NDP Router Advertisement (option type 25) and DHCPv6 (option 23)
|
|
|
|
as DNS resolvers.
|
|
|
|
By default, all the configured addresses are passed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-dhcp-dns " " \fIaddr
|
|
|
|
In \fIpasta\fR mode, assign IPv4 addresses via DHCP (option 23) or IPv6
|
|
|
|
addresses via NDP Router Advertisement (option type 25) and DHCPv6 (option 23)
|
|
|
|
as DNS resolvers.
|
|
|
|
By default, configured addresses, if any, are not passed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-no-dhcp-search " " \fIaddr
|
|
|
|
In \fIpasst\fR mode, do not send the DNS domain search list addresses via DHCP
|
|
|
|
(option 119), via NDP Router Advertisement (option type 31) and DHCPv6 (option
|
|
|
|
24).
|
|
|
|
By default, the DNS domain search list resulting from configuration is passed.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-dhcp-search " " \fIaddr
|
|
|
|
In \fIpasta\fR mode, send the DNS domain search list addresses via DHCP (option
|
|
|
|
119), via NDP Router Advertisement (option type 31) and DHCPv6 (option 24).
|
|
|
|
By default, the DNS domain search list resulting from configuration is not
|
|
|
|
passed.
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-no-tcp
|
|
|
|
Disable the TCP protocol handler. No TCP connections will be accepted host-side,
|
|
|
|
and TCP packets coming from guest or target namespace will be silently dropped.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-no-udp
|
|
|
|
Disable the UDP protocol handler. No UDP traffic coming from the host side will
|
|
|
|
be forwarded, and UDP packets coming from guest or target namespace will be
|
|
|
|
silently dropped.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-no-icmp
|
|
|
|
Disable the ICMP/ICMPv6 echo handler. ICMP and ICMPv6 echo requests coming from
|
|
|
|
guest or target namespace will be silently dropped.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-no-dhcp
|
|
|
|
Disable the DHCP server. DHCP client requests coming from guest or target
|
|
|
|
namespace will be silently dropped.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-no-ndp
|
|
|
|
Disable NDP responses. NDP messages coming from guest or target namespace will
|
|
|
|
be ignored.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-no-dhcpv6
|
|
|
|
Disable the DHCPv6 server. DHCPv6 client requests coming from guest or target
|
|
|
|
namespace will be silently dropped.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-no-ra
|
|
|
|
Disable Router Advertisements. Router Solicitations coming from guest or target
|
|
|
|
namespace will be ignored.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-10-14 05:26:37 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-no-map-gw
|
|
|
|
Don't remap TCP connections and untracked UDP traffic, with the gateway address
|
|
|
|
as destination, to the host.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-4 ", " \-\-ipv4-only
|
|
|
|
Enable IPv4-only operation. IPv6 traffic will be ignored.
|
|
|
|
By default, IPv6 operation is enabled as long as at least an IPv6 default route
|
|
|
|
and an interface address are configured on a given host interface.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-4 ", " \-\-ipv6-only
|
|
|
|
Enable IPv6-only operation. IPv4 traffic will be ignored.
|
|
|
|
By default, IPv4 operation is enabled as long as at least an IPv4 default route
|
|
|
|
and an interface address are configured on a given host interface.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SS \fBpasst\fR-only options
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-s ", " \-\-socket " " \fIpath
|
|
|
|
Path for UNIX domain socket used by \fBqemu\fR(1) or \fBqrap\fR(1) to connect to
|
|
|
|
\fBpasst\fR.
|
|
|
|
Default is to probe a free socket, not accepting connections, starting from
|
|
|
|
\fI/tmp/passt_1.socket\fR to \fI/tmp/passt_64.socket\fR.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-t ", " \-\-tcp-ports " " \fIspec
|
|
|
|
Configure TCP port forwarding to guest. \fIspec\fR can be one of:
|
|
|
|
.RS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR none
|
|
|
|
Don't forward any ports
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR all
|
|
|
|
Forward all unbound, non-ephemeral ports, as permitted by current capabilities.
|
|
|
|
For low (< 1024) ports, see \fBNOTES\fR.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR ports
|
|
|
|
A comma-separated list of ports, optionally ranged with \fI-\fR, and,
|
|
|
|
optionally, with target ports after \fI:\fR, if they differ. Examples:
|
|
|
|
.RS
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
-t 22
|
|
|
|
Forward local port 22 to 22 on the guest
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
-t 22:23
|
|
|
|
Forward local port 22 to port 23 on the guest
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
-t 22,25
|
|
|
|
Forward local ports 22 and 25 to ports 22 and 25 on the guest
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
-t 22-80
|
|
|
|
Forward local ports 22 to 80 to corresponding ports on the guest
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
-t 22-80-32:90
|
|
|
|
Forward local ports 22 to 80 to corresponding ports on the guest plus 10
|
|
|
|
.RE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Default is \fBnone\fR.
|
|
|
|
.RE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-u ", " \-\-udp-ports " " \fIspec
|
|
|
|
Configure UDP port forwarding to guest. \fIspec\fR is as described for TCP
|
|
|
|
above.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note: unless overridden, UDP ports with numbers corresponding to forwarded TCP
|
|
|
|
port numbers are forwarded too, without, however, any port translation. IPv6
|
|
|
|
bound ports are also forwarded for IPv4.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Default is \fBnone\fR.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SS \fBpasta\fR-only options
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-I ", " \-\-ns-ifname " " \fIname
|
|
|
|
Name of tap interface to be created in target namespace.
|
|
|
|
By default, the same interface name as the external, routable interface is used.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-t ", " \-\-tcp-ports " " \fIspec
|
|
|
|
Configure TCP port forwarding to namespace. \fIspec\fR can be one of:
|
|
|
|
.RS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR none
|
|
|
|
Don't forward any ports
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR auto
|
2021-09-27 05:24:30 +02:00
|
|
|
Dynamically forward ports bound in the namespace. The list of ports is
|
|
|
|
periodically derived (every second) from listening sockets reported by
|
|
|
|
\fI/proc/net/tcp\fR and \fI/proc/net/tcp6\fR, see \fBproc\fR(5).
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR ports
|
|
|
|
A comma-separated list of ports, optionally ranged with \fI-\fR, and,
|
|
|
|
optionally, with target ports after \fI:\fR, if they differ. Examples:
|
|
|
|
.RS
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
-t 22
|
|
|
|
Forward local port 22 to 22 in the target namespace
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
-t 22:23
|
|
|
|
Forward local port 22 to port 23 in the target namespace
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
-t 22,25
|
|
|
|
Forward local ports 22 and 25 to ports 22 and 25 in the target namespace
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
-t 22-80
|
|
|
|
Forward local ports 22 to 80 to corresponding ports in the target namespace
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
-t 22-80-32:90
|
|
|
|
Forward local ports 22 to 80 to corresponding ports plus 10 in the target
|
|
|
|
namespace
|
|
|
|
.RE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IPv6 bound ports are also forwarded for IPv4.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Default is \fBauto\fR.
|
|
|
|
.RE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-u ", " \-\-udp-ports " " \fIspec
|
2021-09-27 05:24:30 +02:00
|
|
|
Configure UDP port forwarding to namespace. \fIspec\fR is as described for TCP
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
above, and the list of ports is derived from listening sockets reported by
|
2021-09-27 05:24:30 +02:00
|
|
|
\fI/proc/net/udp\fR and \fI/proc/net/udp6\fR, see \fBproc\fR(5),
|
|
|
|
when \fBpasta\fR starts (not periodically).
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note: unless overridden, UDP ports with numbers corresponding to forwarded TCP
|
|
|
|
port numbers are forwarded too, without, however, any port translation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
IPv6 bound ports are also forwarded for IPv4.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Default is \fBauto\fR.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-T ", " \-\-tcp-ns " " \fIspec
|
|
|
|
Configure TCP port forwarding from target namespace to init namespace.
|
2021-09-27 05:24:30 +02:00
|
|
|
\fIspec\fR is as described above for TCP.
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Default is \fBauto\fR.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-U ", " \-\-udp-ns " " \fIspec
|
|
|
|
Configure UDP port forwarding from target namespace to init namespace.
|
2021-09-27 05:24:30 +02:00
|
|
|
\fIspec\fR is as described above for UDP.
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Default is \fBauto\fR.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-09-29 16:11:06 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-userns " " \fIspec
|
|
|
|
Target user namespace to join, as path or name (i.e. suffix for --nsrun-dir). If
|
|
|
|
PID is given, without this option, the user namespace will be the one of the
|
|
|
|
corresponding process.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option requires PID, PATH or NAME to be specified.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-netns-only
|
passt, pasta: Namespace-based sandboxing, defer seccomp policy application
To reach (at least) a conceptually equivalent security level as
implemented by --enable-sandbox in slirp4netns, we need to create a
new mount namespace and pivot_root() into a new (empty) mountpoint, so
that passt and pasta can't access any filesystem resource after
initialisation.
While at it, also detach IPC, PID (only for passt, to prevent
vulnerabilities based on the knowledge of a target PID), and UTS
namespaces.
With this approach, if we apply the seccomp filters right after the
configuration step, the number of allowed syscalls grows further. To
prevent this, defer the application of seccomp policies after the
initialisation phase, before the main loop, that's where we expect bad
things to happen, potentially. This way, we get back to 22 allowed
syscalls for passt and 34 for pasta, on x86_64.
While at it, move #syscalls notes to specific code paths wherever it
conceptually makes sense.
We have to open all the file handles we'll ever need before
sandboxing:
- the packet capture file can only be opened once, drop instance
numbers from the default path and use the (pre-sandbox) PID instead
- /proc/net/tcp{,v6} and /proc/net/udp{,v6}, for automatic detection
of bound ports in pasta mode, are now opened only once, before
sandboxing, and their handles are stored in the execution context
- the UNIX domain socket for passt is also bound only once, before
sandboxing: to reject clients after the first one, instead of
closing the listening socket, keep it open, accept and immediately
discard new connection if we already have a valid one
Clarify the (unchanged) behaviour for --netns-only in the man page.
To actually make passt and pasta processes run in a separate PID
namespace, we need to unshare(CLONE_NEWPID) before forking to
background (if configured to do so). Introduce a small daemon()
implementation, __daemon(), that additionally saves the PID file
before forking. While running in foreground, the process itself can't
move to a new PID namespace (a process can't change the notion of its
own PID): mention that in the man page.
For some reason, fork() in a detached PID namespace causes SIGTERM
and SIGQUIT to be ignored, even if the handler is still reported as
SIG_DFL: add a signal handler that just exits.
We can now drop most of the pasta_child_handler() implementation,
that took care of terminating all processes running in the same
namespace, if pasta started a shell: the shell itself is now the
init process in that namespace, and all children will terminate
once the init process exits.
Issuing 'echo $$' in a detached PID namespace won't return the
actual namespace PID as seen from the init namespace: adapt
demo and test setup scripts to reflect that.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
2022-02-07 21:11:37 +01:00
|
|
|
Join only a target network namespace, not a user namespace, and don't create one
|
|
|
|
for sandboxing purposes either. This is implied if PATH or NAME are given
|
|
|
|
without \-\-userns.
|
2021-09-29 16:11:06 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-02-18 16:12:11 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-no-netns-quit
|
|
|
|
If the target network namespace is bound to the filesystem (that is, if PATH or
|
|
|
|
NAME are given as target), do not exit once the network namespace is deleted.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-09-29 16:11:06 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-nsrun-dir " " \fIpath
|
|
|
|
Directory for nsfs mountpoints, used as path prefix for names of namespaces.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The default path is shown with --help.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-10-11 12:01:31 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-config-net
|
|
|
|
Configure networking in the namespace: set up addresses and routes as configured
|
2022-02-23 13:22:08 +01:00
|
|
|
or sourced from the host, and bring up the tap interface.
|
2021-10-11 12:01:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.BR \-\-ns-mac-addr " " \fIaddr
|
|
|
|
Configure MAC address \fIaddr\fR on the tap interface in the namespace.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Default is to let the tap driver build a pseudorandom hardware address.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
.SH EXAMPLES
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SS \fBpasta
|
|
|
|
.BR "Create and use a new, connected, user and network namespace"
|
|
|
|
.RS
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
$ iperf3 -s -D
|
|
|
|
$ ./pasta
|
|
|
|
Outbound interface: eth0, namespace interface: eth0
|
|
|
|
ARP:
|
|
|
|
address: 28:16:ad:39:a9:ea
|
|
|
|
DHCP:
|
|
|
|
assign: 192.168.1.118
|
|
|
|
mask: 255.255.255.0
|
|
|
|
router: 192.168.1.1
|
|
|
|
NDP/DHCPv6:
|
|
|
|
assign: 2a02:6d40:3ca5:2001:b81d:fa4a:8cdd:cf17
|
|
|
|
router: fe80::62e3:27ff:fe33:2b01
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
# udhcpc -i eth0
|
|
|
|
udhcpc: started, v1.30.1
|
|
|
|
udhcpc: sending discover
|
|
|
|
udhcpc: sending select for 192.168.1.118
|
|
|
|
udhcpc: lease of 192.168.1.118 obtained, lease time 4294967295
|
|
|
|
# dhclient -6
|
|
|
|
# ip address show
|
|
|
|
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
|
|
|
|
link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
|
|
|
|
inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
inet6 ::1/128 scope host
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65520 qdisc pfifo_fast state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
|
|
|
|
link/ether 5e:90:02:eb:b0:2a brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
|
|
|
|
inet 192.168.1.118/24 brd 192.168.1.255 scope global eth0
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
inet6 2a02:6d40:3ca5:2001:b81d:fa4a:8cdd:cf17/128 scope global
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
inet6 2a02:6d40:3ca5:2001:5c90:2ff:feeb:b02a/64 scope global dynamic mngtmpaddr
|
|
|
|
valid_lft 3591sec preferred_lft 3591sec
|
|
|
|
inet6 fe80::5c90:2ff:feeb:b02a/64 scope link
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
# ip route show
|
|
|
|
default via 192.168.1.1 dev eth0
|
|
|
|
192.168.1.0/24 dev eth0 proto kernel scope link src 192.168.1.118
|
|
|
|
# ip -6 route show
|
|
|
|
2a02:6d40:3ca5:2001:b81d:fa4a:8cdd:cf17 dev eth0 proto kernel metric 256 pref medium
|
|
|
|
2a02:6d40:3ca5:2001::/64 dev eth0 proto kernel metric 256 expires 3584sec pref medium
|
|
|
|
fe80::/64 dev eth0 proto kernel metric 256 pref medium
|
|
|
|
default via fe80::62e3:27ff:fe33:2b01 dev eth0 proto ra metric 1024 expires 3584sec pref medium
|
|
|
|
# iperf3 -c 127.0.0.1 -t1
|
|
|
|
Connecting to host 127.0.0.1, port 5201
|
|
|
|
[ 5] local 127.0.0.1 port 51938 connected to 127.0.0.1 port 5201
|
|
|
|
[ ID] Interval Transfer Bitrate Retr Cwnd
|
|
|
|
[ 5] 0.00-1.00 sec 4.46 GBytes 38.3 Gbits/sec 0 3.93 MBytes
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
[ ID] Interval Transfer Bitrate Retr
|
|
|
|
[ 5] 0.00-1.00 sec 4.46 GBytes 38.3 Gbits/sec 0 sender
|
|
|
|
[ 5] 0.00-1.41 sec 4.45 GBytes 27.1 Gbits/sec receiver
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
iperf Done.
|
|
|
|
# iperf3 -c ::1 -t1
|
|
|
|
Connecting to host ::1, port 5201
|
|
|
|
[ 5] local ::1 port 50108 connected to ::1 port 5201
|
|
|
|
[ ID] Interval Transfer Bitrate Retr Cwnd
|
|
|
|
[ 5] 0.00-1.00 sec 4.35 GBytes 37.4 Gbits/sec 0 4.99 MBytes
|
|
|
|
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
|
|
|
|
[ ID] Interval Transfer Bitrate Retr
|
|
|
|
[ 5] 0.00-1.00 sec 4.35 GBytes 37.4 Gbits/sec 0 sender
|
|
|
|
[ 5] 0.00-1.41 sec 4.35 GBytes 26.4 Gbits/sec receiver
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
iperf Done.
|
|
|
|
# ping -c1 -4 spaghetti.pizza
|
|
|
|
PING spaghetti.pizza (172.67.192.217) 56(84) bytes of data.
|
|
|
|
64 bytes from 172.67.192.217: icmp_seq=1 ttl=255 time=37.3 ms
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--- spaghetti.pizza ping statistics ---
|
|
|
|
1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms
|
|
|
|
# ping -c1 -6 spaghetti.pizza
|
|
|
|
PING spaghetti.pizza(2606:4700:3034::6815:147a (2606:4700:3034::6815:147a)) 56 data bytes
|
|
|
|
64 bytes from 2606:4700:3034::6815:147a: icmp_seq=1 ttl=255 time=35.6 ms
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--- spaghetti.pizza ping statistics ---
|
|
|
|
1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms
|
|
|
|
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 35.605/35.605/35.605/0.000 ms
|
|
|
|
# logout
|
|
|
|
$
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.RE
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.BR "Connect an existing user and network namespace"
|
|
|
|
.RS
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
$ unshare -rUn
|
|
|
|
# echo $$
|
|
|
|
2446678
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
.BR " [From another terminal]"
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
$ ./pasta 2446678
|
|
|
|
Outbound interface: eth0, namespace interface: eth0
|
|
|
|
ARP:
|
|
|
|
address: 28:16:ad:39:a9:ea
|
|
|
|
DHCP:
|
|
|
|
assign: 192.168.1.118
|
|
|
|
mask: 255.255.255.0
|
|
|
|
router: 192.168.1.1
|
|
|
|
NDP/DHCPv6:
|
|
|
|
assign: 2a02:6d40:3ca5:2001:b81d:fa4a:8cdd:cf17
|
|
|
|
router: fe80::62e3:27ff:fe33:2b01
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
.BR " [Back to the original terminal]"
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
# udhcpc -i eth0
|
|
|
|
udhcpc: started, v1.30.1
|
|
|
|
udhcpc: sending discover
|
|
|
|
udhcpc: sending select for 192.168.1.118
|
|
|
|
udhcpc: lease of 192.168.1.118 obtained, lease time 4294967295
|
|
|
|
# dhclient -6
|
|
|
|
# ip address show
|
|
|
|
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
|
|
|
|
link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
|
|
|
|
inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
inet6 ::1/128 scope host
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
2: eth0: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65520 qdisc pfifo_fast state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
|
|
|
|
link/ether fa:c1:2a:27:92:a9 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
|
|
|
|
inet 192.168.1.118/24 brd 192.168.1.255 scope global eth0
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
inet6 2a02:6d40:3ca5:2001:b81d:fa4a:8cdd:cf17/128 scope global
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
inet6 2a02:6d40:3ca5:2001:f8c1:2aff:fe27:92a9/64 scope global dynamic mngtmpaddr
|
|
|
|
valid_lft 3594sec preferred_lft 3594sec
|
|
|
|
inet6 fe80::f8c1:2aff:fe27:92a9/64 scope link
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
.RE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SS \fBpasst
|
|
|
|
.BR "Start and connect a guest with basic port forwarding"
|
|
|
|
.RS
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
$ ./passt -f -t 2222:22
|
|
|
|
Outbound interface: eth0
|
|
|
|
ARP:
|
|
|
|
address: 28:16:ad:39:a9:ea
|
|
|
|
DHCP:
|
|
|
|
assign: 192.168.1.118
|
|
|
|
mask: 255.255.255.0
|
|
|
|
router: 192.168.1.1
|
|
|
|
search:
|
|
|
|
redhat.com
|
|
|
|
NDP/DHCPv6:
|
|
|
|
assign: 2a02:6d40:3ca5:2001:b81d:fa4a:8cdd:cf17
|
|
|
|
router: fe80::62e3:27ff:fe33:2b01
|
|
|
|
search:
|
|
|
|
redhat.com
|
|
|
|
UNIX domain socket bound at /tmp/passt_1.socket
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
You can now start qrap:
|
|
|
|
./qrap 5 kvm ... -net socket,fd=5 -net nic,model=virtio
|
|
|
|
or directly qemu, patched with:
|
|
|
|
qemu/0001-net-Allow-also-UNIX-domain-sockets-to-be-used-as-net.patch
|
|
|
|
as follows:
|
|
|
|
kvm ... -net socket,connect=/tmp/passt_1.socket -net nic,model=virtio
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
.BR " [From another terminal]"
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
$ ./qrap 5 kvm test.qcow2 -m 1024 -display none -nodefaults -nographic -net socket,fd=5 -net nic,model=virtio
|
|
|
|
Connected to /tmp/passt_1.socket
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
.BR " [Back to the original terminal]"
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
passt: DHCP: ack to request
|
|
|
|
passt: from 52:54:00:12:34:56
|
|
|
|
passt: NDP: received NS, sending NA
|
|
|
|
passt: NDP: received RS, sending RA
|
|
|
|
passt: DHCPv6: received SOLICIT, sending ADVERTISE
|
|
|
|
passt: NDP: received NS, sending NA
|
|
|
|
passt: DHCPv6: received REQUEST/RENEW/CONFIRM, sending REPLY
|
|
|
|
passt: NDP: received NS, sending NA
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
.BR " [From yet another terminal]"
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
$ ssh -p 2222 root@localhost
|
|
|
|
root@localhost's password:
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
.BR " [...]"
|
|
|
|
.nf
|
|
|
|
# ip address show
|
|
|
|
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
|
|
|
|
link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
|
|
|
|
inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
inet6 ::1/128 scope host
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
2: ens2: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65520 qdisc pfifo_fast state UP group default qlen 1000
|
|
|
|
link/ether 52:54:00:12:34:56 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
|
|
|
|
inet 192.168.1.118/24 brd 192.168.1.255 scope global noprefixroute ens2
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
inet6 2a02:6d40:3ca5:2001:b81d:fa4a:8cdd:cf17/128 scope global noprefixroute
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
inet6 2a02:6d40:3ca5:2001:b019:9ae2:a2fe:e6b4/64 scope global dynamic noprefixroute
|
|
|
|
valid_lft 3588sec preferred_lft 3588sec
|
|
|
|
inet6 fe80::1f98:d09f:9309:9e77/64 scope link noprefixroute
|
|
|
|
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
|
|
|
|
.fi
|
|
|
|
.RE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SH NOTES
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SS Handling of traffic with local destination and source addressses
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Both \fBpasst\fR and \fBpasta\fR can bind on ports with a local address,
|
|
|
|
depending on the configuration. Local destination or source addresses need to be
|
|
|
|
changed before packets are delivered to the guest or target namespace: most
|
|
|
|
operating systems would drop packets received from non-loopback interfaces with
|
|
|
|
local addresses, and it would also be impossible for guest or target namespace
|
|
|
|
to route answers back.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For convenience, and somewhat arbitrarily, the source address on these packets
|
|
|
|
is translated to the address of the default IPv4 or IPv6 gateway -- this is
|
|
|
|
known to be an existing, valid address on the same subnet.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Loopback destination addresses are instead translated to the observed external
|
|
|
|
address of the guest or target namespace. For IPv6 packets, if usage of a
|
|
|
|
link-local address by guest or namespace has ever been observed, and the
|
|
|
|
original destination address is also a link-local address, the observed
|
|
|
|
link-local address is used. Otherwise, the observed global address is used. For
|
|
|
|
both IPv4 and IPv6, if no addresses have been seen yet, the configured addresses
|
|
|
|
will be used instead.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For example, if \fBpasst\fR or \fBpasta\fR receive a connection from 127.0.0.1,
|
|
|
|
with destination 127.0.0.10, and the default IPv4 gateway is 192.0.2.1, while
|
|
|
|
the last observed source address from guest or namespace is 192.0.2.2, this will
|
|
|
|
be translated to a connection from 192.0.2.1 to 192.0.2.2.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Similarly, for traffic coming from guest or namespace, packets with destination
|
|
|
|
address corresponding to the default gateway will have their destination address
|
|
|
|
translated to a loopback address, if and only if a packet, in the opposite
|
|
|
|
direction, with a loopback destination or source address, port-wise matching for
|
|
|
|
UDP, or connection-wise for TCP, has been recently forwarded to guest or
|
2021-10-14 05:26:37 +02:00
|
|
|
namespace. This behaviour can be disabled with \-\-no\-map\-gw.
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SS Handling of local traffic in pasta
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Depending on the configuration, \fBpasta\fR can bind to local ports in the init
|
|
|
|
namespace, in the target namespace, or both, and forward connections and packets
|
|
|
|
to corresponding ports in the other namespace.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To avoid unnecessary overhead, these connections and packets are not forwarded
|
|
|
|
through the tap device connecting the namespaces: \fBpasta\fR creates a socket
|
|
|
|
in the destination namespace, with matching Layer-4 protocol, and uses it to
|
|
|
|
forward local data. For TCP, data is forwarded between the originating socket
|
|
|
|
and the new socket using the \fBsplice\fR(2) system call, and for UDP, a pair
|
|
|
|
of \fBrecvmmsg\fR(2) and \fBsendmmsg\fR(2) system calls deals with packet
|
|
|
|
transfers.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This bypass only applies to local connections and traffic, because it's not
|
|
|
|
possible to bind sockets to foreign addresses.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SS Binding to low numbered ports (well-known or system ports, up to 1023)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the port forwarding configuration requires binding to port numbers lower than
|
|
|
|
1024, \fBpasst\fR and \fBpasta\fR will try to bind to them, but will fail if not
|
|
|
|
running as root, or without the \fICAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE\fR Linux capability, see
|
2021-10-12 23:03:01 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBservices\fR(5) and \fBcapabilities\fR(7). To grant the
|
|
|
|
\fICAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE\fR capability to passt, you can issue, as root:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.RS
|
|
|
|
setcap 'cap_net_bind_service=+ep' $(which passt)
|
|
|
|
.RE
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SS ICMP/ICMPv6 Echo sockets
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ICMP and ICMPv6 Echo requests coming from guest or target namespace are handled
|
|
|
|
using so-called "ping" sockets, introduced in Linux 2.6.30. To preserve the
|
|
|
|
original identifier (see RFC 792, page 14, for ICMP, and RFC 4443, section 4.1,
|
|
|
|
for ICMPv6), \fBpasst\fR and \fBpasta\fR try to bind these sockets using the
|
|
|
|
observed source identifier as "port" -- that corresponds to Echo identifiers
|
|
|
|
for "ping" sockets.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As \fBbind\fR(2) failures were seen with particularly restrictive SELinux
|
|
|
|
policies, a fall-back mechanism maps different identifiers to different sockets,
|
|
|
|
and identifiers in replies will be mapped back to the original identifier of the
|
|
|
|
request. However, if \fBbind\fR(2) fails and the fall-back mechanism is used,
|
|
|
|
echo requests will be forwarded with different, albeit unique, identifiers.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For ICMP and ICMPv6 Echo requests to work, the \fIping_group_range\fR parameter
|
|
|
|
needs to include the PID of \fBpasst\fR or \fBpasta\fR, see \fBicmp\fR(7).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SS pasta and loopback interface
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
As \fBpasta\fR connects to an existing namespace, or once it creates a new
|
|
|
|
namespace, it will also ensure that the loopback interface, \fIlo\fR, is brought
|
|
|
|
up. This is needed to bind ports using the loopback address in the namespace.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SS TCP sending window and \fITCP_INFO\fB before Linux 5.3
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To synchronise the TCP sending window from host Layer-4 sockets to the TCP
|
|
|
|
parameters announced in TCP segments sent over the Layer-2 interface,
|
|
|
|
\fBpasst\fR and \fBpasta\fR routinely query the size of the sending window seen
|
|
|
|
by the kernel on the corresponding socket using the \fITCP_INFO\fR socket
|
|
|
|
option, see \fBtcp\fR(7). Before Linux 5.3, i.e. before Linux kernel commit
|
|
|
|
8f7baad7f035 ("tcp: Add snd_wnd to TCP_INFO"), the sending window
|
|
|
|
(\fIsnd_wnd\fR field) is not available.
|
|
|
|
|
2021-10-12 22:56:36 +02:00
|
|
|
If the sending window cannot be queried, it will always be announced as the
|
|
|
|
current sending buffer size to guest or target namespace. This might affect
|
|
|
|
throughput of TCP connections.
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SH LIMITATIONS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Currently, IGMP/MLD proxying (RFC 4605) and support for SCTP (RFC 4960) are not
|
|
|
|
implemented.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
TCP Selective Acknowledgment (RFC 2018), as well as Protection Against Wrapped
|
|
|
|
Sequences (PAWS) and Round-Trip Time Measurement (RTTM), both described by RFC
|
|
|
|
7232, are currently not implemented.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SH AUTHOR
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SH REPORTING BUGS
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-19 04:39:47 +01:00
|
|
|
Please report issues on the bug tracker at https://passt.top/passt/bugs, or
|
|
|
|
send a message to the passt-user@passt.top mailing list, see
|
|
|
|
https://passt.top/passt/lists.
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SH COPYRIGHT
|
|
|
|
|
2022-02-19 04:39:47 +01:00
|
|
|
Copyright (c) 2020-2022 Red Hat GmbH.
|
2021-08-19 20:22:40 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\fBpasst\fR and \fBpasta\fR are free software: you can redistribute them and/or
|
|
|
|
modify them under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as
|
|
|
|
published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
|
|
|
|
(at your option) any later version.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SH SEE ALSO
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
\fBnamespaces\fR(7), \fBqemu\fR(1), \fBqrap\fR(1), \fBslirp4netns\fR(1).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
High-level documentation is available at https://passt.top/passt/about/.
|