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packet: More cautious checks to avoid pointer arithmetic UB
packet_check_range and vu_packet_check_range() verify that the packet or section of packet we're interested in lies in the packet buffer pool we expect it to. However, in doing so it doesn't avoid the possibility of an integer overflow while performing pointer arithmetic, with is UB. In fact, AFAICT it's UB even to use arbitrary pointer arithmetic to construct a pointer outside of a known valid buffer. To do this safely, we can't calculate the end of a memory region with pointer addition when then the length as untrusted. Instead we must work out the offset of one memory region within another using pointer subtraction, then do integer checks against the length of the outer region. We then need to be careful about the order of checks so that those integer checks can't themselves overflow. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
4592719a74
commit
e43e00719d
2 changed files with 16 additions and 6 deletions
12
packet.c
12
packet.c
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@ -52,9 +52,15 @@ static int packet_check_range(const struct pool *p, const char *ptr, size_t len,
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return -1;
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}
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if (ptr + len > p->buf + p->buf_size) {
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trace("packet range end %p after buffer end %p, %s:%i",
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(void *)(ptr + len), (void *)(p->buf + p->buf_size),
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if (len > p->buf_size) {
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trace("packet range length %zu larger than buffer %zu, %s:%i",
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len, p->buf_size, func, line);
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return -1;
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}
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if ((size_t)(ptr - p->buf) > p->buf_size - len) {
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trace("packet range %p, len %zu after buffer end %p, %s:%i",
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(void *)ptr, len, (void *)(p->buf + p->buf_size),
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func, line);
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return -1;
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}
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10
vu_common.c
10
vu_common.c
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@ -36,11 +36,15 @@ int vu_packet_check_range(void *buf, const char *ptr, size_t len)
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struct vu_dev_region *dev_region;
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for (dev_region = buf; dev_region->mmap_addr; dev_region++) {
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/* NOLINTNEXTLINE(performance-no-int-to-ptr) */
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char *m = (char *)(uintptr_t)dev_region->mmap_addr +
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uintptr_t base_addr = dev_region->mmap_addr +
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dev_region->mmap_offset;
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/* NOLINTNEXTLINE(performance-no-int-to-ptr) */
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const char *base = (const char *)base_addr;
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if (m <= ptr && ptr + len <= m + dev_region->size)
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ASSERT(base_addr >= dev_region->mmap_addr);
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if (len <= dev_region->size && base <= ptr &&
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(size_t)(ptr - base) <= dev_region->size - len)
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return 0;
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}
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