d72a1e7bb9
passt/pasta contains a number of routines designed to isolate passt from the rest of the system for security. These are spread through util.c and passt.c. Move them together into a new isolation.c file. Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
167 lines
3.5 KiB
C
167 lines
3.5 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
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/* PASST - Plug A Simple Socket Transport
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* for qemu/UNIX domain socket mode
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*
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* PASTA - Pack A Subtle Tap Abstraction
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* for network namespace/tap device mode
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*
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* isolation.c - Self isolation helpers
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*
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* Copyright Red Hat
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* Author: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
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* Author: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
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*/
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <grp.h>
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#include <inttypes.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <pwd.h>
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#include <sched.h>
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#include <stddef.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <sys/mount.h>
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#include <sys/prctl.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/syscall.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <netinet/if_ether.h>
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/filter.h>
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#include <linux/seccomp.h>
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#include "util.h"
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#include "seccomp.h"
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#include "passt.h"
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#include "isolation.h"
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/**
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* drop_caps() - Drop capabilities we might have except for CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
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*/
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void drop_caps(void)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
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if (i == CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)
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continue;
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prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i, 0, 0, 0);
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}
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}
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/**
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* drop_root() - Switch to given UID and GID
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* @uid: User ID to switch to
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* @gid: Group ID to switch to
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*/
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void drop_root(uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
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{
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if (setgroups(0, NULL)) {
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/* If we don't start with CAP_SETGID, this will EPERM */
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if (errno != EPERM) {
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err("Can't drop supplementary groups: %s",
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strerror(errno));
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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}
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if (!setgid(gid) && !setuid(uid))
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return;
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err("Can't change user/group, exiting");
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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/**
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* sandbox() - Unshare IPC, mount, PID, UTS, and user namespaces, "unmount" root
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*
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* Return: negative error code on failure, zero on success
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*/
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int sandbox(struct ctx *c)
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{
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int flags = CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS;
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if (!c->netns_only) {
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if (c->pasta_userns_fd == -1)
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flags |= CLONE_NEWUSER;
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else
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setns(c->pasta_userns_fd, CLONE_NEWUSER);
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}
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c->pasta_userns_fd = -1;
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/* If we run in foreground, we have no chance to actually move to a new
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* PID namespace. For passt, use CLONE_NEWPID anyway, in case somebody
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* ever gets around seccomp profiles -- there's no harm in passing it.
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*/
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if (!c->foreground || c->mode == MODE_PASST)
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flags |= CLONE_NEWPID;
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if (unshare(flags)) {
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perror("unshare");
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return -errno;
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}
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if (mount("", "/", "", MS_UNBINDABLE | MS_REC, NULL)) {
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perror("mount /");
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return -errno;
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}
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if (mount("", TMPDIR, "tmpfs",
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MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NOSUID | MS_RDONLY,
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"nr_inodes=2,nr_blocks=0")) {
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perror("mount tmpfs");
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return -errno;
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}
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if (chdir(TMPDIR)) {
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perror("chdir");
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return -errno;
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}
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if (syscall(SYS_pivot_root, ".", ".")) {
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perror("pivot_root");
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return -errno;
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}
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if (umount2(".", MNT_DETACH | UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW)) {
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perror("umount2");
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return -errno;
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}
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drop_caps(); /* Relative to the new user namespace this time. */
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* seccomp() - Set up seccomp filters depending on mode, won't return on failure
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* @c: Execution context
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*/
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void seccomp(const struct ctx *c)
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{
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struct sock_fprog prog;
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if (c->mode == MODE_PASST) {
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prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter_passt);
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prog.filter = filter_passt;
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} else {
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prog.len = (unsigned short)ARRAY_SIZE(filter_pasta);
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prog.filter = filter_pasta;
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}
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if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) ||
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prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &prog)) {
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perror("prctl");
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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}
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